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American concepts of sovereignty and property are rooted in Roman 
law. As described by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter:
“Dominion, from the Roman concept dominium, was concerned with 
property and ownership, as against imperium, which related to political 
sovereignty.”1 The dominium, bestowed on individuals and firms, 
granted exclusive rights to possession and enjoyment over parcels of land 
and other resources. On the other hand, the imperium, held by the people 
in their sovereign capacity, reserved a residuum of power to divest the 
private owners of their entitlements by “regulations that [were] necessary 
to the common good and general welfare.”2 In the history of American 
private ownership, property was in the first instance a creation of the 
sovereign states, each of which “possesse[d] the power of disposing of 
the unappropriated lands within its own limits, in such manner as its own 
judgment shall dictate.” 3
With its historical roots, exclusive ownership of land in the U.S. 
proved useful in the creation of a productive market-driven capitalist 
economy. The existence of private property encouraged owners to invest 
capital to improve their entitlements with an assurance of their 
“investment-backed expectation”4 that they could “reap that which they 
had sowed.”5 Adam Smith touted private property as leading an 
* Professor Emeritus of the University of Maryland School of Law. I thank Alice Johnson, a 
Research Fellow in the Thurgood Marshall Law Library for outstanding editorial assistance. An 
abridged version of this article will appear in David Spinoza Tanenhaus,  Encyclopedia of the 
Supreme Court of the United States. © 2008 Gale, a part of Cengage Learning, Inc. Reproduced by 
permission. www.cengage.com/permissions. 
1. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 43–44 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis added). 
2. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. 53, 84 (1851). 
3. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 128 (1810). 
4. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1213 (1967). 
5. Galatians 6:7 (King James) (“Be not deceived; God is not mocked: for whatsoever a man 
soweth, that shall he also reap.”).
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“invisible hand” so that each individual in pursuit of his private interest
served the common weal.6
While it helped create a market-driven economy, the principle of 
exclusive ownership can be used inefficiently. The use of private 
property might pose a risk to the health and safety of the community. Or 
the state might simply want to reclaim the resources (the land or the 
goods) for public purposes. The sovereign created the private property in 
the first place, so what if it subsequently changed its mind and enacted 
legislation that diminished the value of previously existing rights of 
private property? 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution proscribes 
that: “No person shall be . . . deprived of . . . property, without due 
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation.”7 All scholars agree that a formal taking of property 
under the constitutional power of eminent domain would require the 
sovereign to pay just compensation. And “[a]ll agree that the legislature 
cannot bargain away the police power of a State.”8 But should the owner 
of private property in all “fairness and justice”9 be compensated when a 
regulation diminishes the economic value of her private property? 
The question of whether a sovereign regulation has “taken” private 
property without just compensation has puzzled the United States 
Supreme Court for over two hundred years in over four hundred cases.10
And today’s Supreme Court remains fundamentally divided into two 
blocs on this issue. This “great divide” is sometimes attributed to a 
difference in judicial philosophy. Those in the Court’s conservative wing 
are typically described as practitioners of “judicial restraint” who defer to 
the decisions of legislatures. Those in the Court’s liberal wing are said to 
be “judicial activists” who are intent on reconstructing the Constitution’s 
language to meet the exigencies of the times. The Court’s “constitutional 
property” jurisprudence belies this stereotype. Its right wing seeks to 
expand the Takings Clause beyond its original meaning so as to second-
guess legislatures and to discourage government activity. Conversely, the 
6. 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 423 (Edwin Cannan ed., Random House, Inc. 1937) (1776).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. V. These clauses do not comprise the full text of the Fifth 
Amendment. The Fifth Amendment provides other protections as well. 
8. Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 817 (1879). 
9. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (“The Fifth Amendment’s 
guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a public use without just compensation was 
designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all 
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”).
10. A Lexis Terms and Connectors search (“taking or take and fifth amendment or fourteenth 
amendment and just compensation”) in U.S. Supreme Court Cases, Lawyers’ Edition, yielded 480 
cases (last visited Apr. 23, 2008). 
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left wing limits the text to its original meaning and thereby passively 
allows legislative bodies greater freedom to make public choices. This 
paper chronicles the leading cases and finds that the Court’s present 
interpretation of “regulatory takings” sits upon a shaky foundation of 
split decisions; the Court’s construction of “constitutional property” 
remains a work in progress. 
II.  SOVEREIGNTY
A.  Chain of Title 
Sovereignty in the United States of America can be metaphorically 
linked into a chain of title dating back to William the Conqueror’s 
conquest of England in 1066 A.D.11 William claimed all of the kingdom, 
and having established himself absolute ruler, he divided the land among 
his comrades in arms and the other great landlords who had not opposed 
him. It was not until the Magna Carta two centuries later in 1215 that the 
Crown agreed to limit its sovereignty by promising to be subject to the 
due process of law.12
In the fifteenth century the English Crown claimed North America 
by “right of discovery.”13 Through various agencies it established 
colonies; some were trading corporations, others religious congregations, 
and still others proprietorships.14 Subject always to the preeminence of 
the Crown, the colonial agents were empowered both to enact laws for 
the governance of their colonies and to grant their lands in return for 
whatever other consideration the market would bear. They adopted the 
English institution of property. 
In 1776 the American colonists declared their independence from the 
English Crown. The U.S. Supreme Court later described the 
consequences of their victory as follows: “Upon the American 
11. See GEORGE W. KEETON, THE NORMAN CONQUEST AND THE COMMON LAW 25–26, 35–
36 (1966). 
12. See MAGNA CARTA 39 (1215), translated in J.C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA app. 6, at 461 
(2d ed. 1992) (“No free man shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or outlawed or exiled or in any 
way ruined, nor will we go or send against him, except by the lawful judgement [sic] of his peers or 
by the law of the land.”).
13. See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 576–77 (1823); see also CHARLES A. BEARD,
MARY R. BEARD & WILLIAM BEARD, THE BEARDS’ NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
22–23 (1960) [hereinafter BEARD] (“Under English law all the territory claimed in America 
belonged to the Crown.”).
14. One colony established by trading company was Jamestown, which was founded in 1607 
under the London Company. See BEARD, supra note 13, at 24. One religious congregation was the 
Pilgrims, who established Plymouth Colony in 1620 on land that belonged to the Plymouth 
Company. See id. Maryland and Pennsylvania are examples of proprietorship colonies. Maryland 
was granted to Lord Baltimore in 1632, and Pennsylvania was granted to William Penn in 1681. 
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Revolution, [all rights of the Crown and of the Parliament] vested in the 
original states within their respective borders, [were] subject to the rights 
surrendered by the constitution to the United States.”15
B.  State and Federal Sovereignty 
Nineteenth-century jurist Thomas M. Cooley described the sovereign 
powers of these thirteen newly independent states in his Treatise on the 
Constitutional Limitations which Rest upon the Legislative Power of the 
States of the American Union.16 He opined that under the emergent 
American system of constitutional democracy the state legislatures had 
three inherent sovereign powers: the power of eminent domain, the 
power to tax, and the police power.17 Eminent domain arose from natural 
law as the government’s inherent power to take private property for 
public uses.18 The “power of taxing the people and their property [was] 
essential to the very existence of government” so as to leave a state “the 
command of all its resources.”19 And the common-law concept of the 
police power provided the states with “the power of promoting the public 
welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property.”20
In 1787 the thirteen states joined into a federal union and adopted a 
constitution whereby the states surrendered a limited number of their 
powers to a national government. The national government was 
preeminent within the realm of its delegated powers.21 And the most 
expansive delegation provided: “The Congress shall have power to lay 
and collect Taxes, . . . [t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several 
15. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894). 
16. See generally THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (Boston, 
Little, Brown, & Co. 5th ed. 1883). Cooley was a Professor of Law at the University of Michigan 
Law Department from 1859 through 1884. He also served as a judge on the Michigan Supreme 
Court from 1864 through 1885. See Michigan Supreme Court Historical Society, http://www. 
micourthistory.org/bios.php?id=35 (last visited Feb. 19, 2009). 
17. See COOLEY, supra note 16, at 593–746. 
18. See 2 HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES 385, 807 (James Brown 
Scott ed., Francis W. Kelsey trans., William S. Hein & Co. 1995) (1625). 
19. See Justice Marshall’s dicta in M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 428–30
(1819). 
20. ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, at 
iii (photo. reprint 1976) (1904). 
21. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the laws of the United States 
which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the Judges in every state 
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary 
notwithstanding.”).
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States, . . . [a]nd [t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper 
for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers . . . .”22
C.  Constitutional Limitations 
As originally enacted, the U.S. Constitution was primarily a 
delegation of power to the national government, not a limitation on the 
powers of governments to impinge upon the citizenry’s personal liberties 
or property rights. The one notable exception existed in Article I, Section 
10, which provided: “No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the 
Obligation of Contracts . . . .”23 The founding fathers—many of whom 
were wealth creditors—drafted this provision conscious that the 
“widespread distress following the revolutionary period, and the plight of 
debtors, [would call] forth in the States an ignoble array of legislative 
schemes for the defeat of creditors and the invasion of contractual 
obligations.”24
Four years later in 1791, Congress adopted the Bill of Rights—in the 
form of the first ten amendments to the Constitution—for the express 
purpose of limiting the sovereign’s power over the people. Two clauses 
in the Fifth Amendment expressly called for the protection of property. 
The first provided that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law . . . .”25 This “due process” 
language was “old history”—essentially a restatement of the Magna 
Carta.26 But the second clause was original. It provided: “[N]or shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”27
This Takings Clause implicitly granted Congress the power to take 
property through an eminent domain condemnation procedure and 
explicitly required that the national government pay “just compensation” 
when it exercised that power. But, the Fifth Amendment left two 
unanswered questions. First, did the Takings Clause limit the 
expropriatory powers of all sovereigns (local, state, and federal), or did it 
only apply as against the newly created national government? And 
second, what constituted the “private property” that it protected?
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
24. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 427 (1934); see also Ogden v. 
Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 354–55 (1827). 
25. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
26. See MAGNA CARTA, supra note 12, at 461 (“No free man shall be taken or imprisoned or 
disseised or outlawed or exiled or in any way ruined, nor will we go or send against him, except by 
the lawful judgement [sic] of his peers or by the law of the land.”).
27. Id.
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The first question was answered and re-answered in two nineteenth-
century Supreme Court cases. In the 1833 case of Barron v. Mayor & 
City Council of Baltimore,28 a shipwright sought just compensation from 
the City of Baltimore (a creature of the State of Maryland) when 
sediment from the city’s street grading project destroyed the value of his 
wharf-property.29 The Supreme Court denied relief on jurisdictional 
grounds, holding that “the fifth amendment . . . is intended solely as a 
limitation on the exercise of power by the government of the United 
States, and is not applicable to the legislation of the states.”30
In the immediate aftermath of the decision in Barron, there were no 
national constitutional constraints on the taking of private property by 
state or local governments. Most of the state constitutions, however, 
provided some protections for private property. Many had “due process” 
language, and some copied the Fifth Amendment with language 
expressly requiring just compensation for a “taking.”31 But until 1868, 
the constitutional limitations against state actions taking private property 
varied from state to state.
During the reconstruction following the American Civil War, the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was ratified in 1868.32
Although its primary thrust was to extend the privileges and immunities 
of citizenship to the newly emancipated slaves, it also included a 
property clause. It imposed a due process requirement on state (and 
local) governmental actions with language nearly identical to that in the 
Fifth Amendment: “[N]or shall any state deprive any person of . . .
property, without due process of law . . . .”33 But the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not include language expressly requiring that state 
“takings” of private property be supported by “just compensation,” and 
the question persisted of whether compensation was due. 
The question was answered in 1897 when the U.S. Supreme Court 
decided Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. City of Chicago.34 The Court opined 
that “the due process of law enjoined by the Fourteenth Amendment
requires compensation to be made or adequately secured to the owner of 
private property taken for public use under the authority of a state.”35
Hence, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, taken together, imposed a 
28. 32 U.S. 243 (1833). 
29. See id. at 243–44. 
30. Id. at 250–51. 
31. See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860,
at 63–66 (1977). 
32. See, e.g., BEARD, supra note 13, at 274. 
33. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
34. 166 U.S. 226 (1897). 
35. Id. at 235. 
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nationwide requirement that private property can only be taken for a 
public use and only upon the payment of just compensation. But, a larger 
question remained unanswered: what was the nature of the private 
property that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments protected from 
federal or state expropriation? 
III.  PROPERTY
A.  Original Conception of Private Property 
In the aftermath of American independence, the thirteen sovereign 
states embraced the “Common Law of England . . . which, by 
experience, [has] been found applicable to their local and other 
circumstances . . . .”36 After confiscating all property belonging to the 
Crown, the next order of business for America’s landed revolutionaries 
was to confirm their entitlement to all properties they had previously 
been granted by the colonial proprietors. The English common-law 
concept of property incorporated into American post-revolutionary law 
corresponded with Sir William Blackstone’s description in his 
Commentaries on the Laws of England.37 He conceptualized property as 
that “de[s]potic dominion which one man claims and exerci[s]es over the 
external things of the world, in total exclu[s]ion of the right of any other 
individual in the univer[s]e.”38 The “things” Blackstone had in mind 
corresponded with the Roman law lexicon of either land or movables, but 
he rechristened them as either real property (land) or personal property
(“goods; money, and all other movables”).39
According to Blackstone’s view, the owner of private property was 
entitled to possession of some tangible thing with the accompanying 
right to exclude all others from using it. The Supreme Court’s original 
understanding of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment embraced 
Blackstone’s notion of private property as the right to exclusive physical 
possession of a tangible resource. In the Court’s view, the clause
protected an owner’s property from seizure but did not protect it against 
regulations or taxes affecting its value.40
36. See, e.g., MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 5. 
37. 2 SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (photo. 
reprint 1978) (9th ed. 1783). 
38. Id. at 2. 
39. Id. at 16. 
40. See, e.g., John F. Hart, Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern Takings Doctrine,
109 HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1253 (1996); William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of 
the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 782–83, 794–98 (1995). 
Treanor traces the history of the just compensation principle and surveys early Supreme Court 
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The application of this distinction can be seen in two nineteenth-
century Supreme Court cases. In Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co.,41 a
navigation improvement project authorized by the Wisconsin legislature 
resulted in the construction of a dam that flooded the claimant’s land.42
The Court held that “where real estate is actually invaded . . . so as to 
effectually destroy or impair its usefulness, it is a taking, within the 
meaning of the Constitution . . . .”43 Conversely, in Mugler v. Kansas,44
the Court held an alcohol prohibition statute enacted by the Kansas 
legislature to be a legitimate exercise of the police power, even though it 
materially diminished the value of the building and equipment that the 
plaintiff employed in the manufacture of beer.45 Although the value of 
the plaintiff’s property may have been reduced, his brewery building was 
not invaded, and his equipment and personal property were not 
confiscated. 
Less well-delineated was the nineteenth-century rule employed to 
determine whether the “exaction from the owner of private property of 
the cost of a public improvement . . . [was] a taking, under the guise of 
taxation, of private property for public use without compensation.”46 In 
the opinion of Thomas Cooley, “[t]here can be no justification for any 
proceeding which charges the land with an assessment greater than the 
benefits; it is a plain case of appropriating private property to public uses 
without compensation.”47 In Village of Norwood v. Baker,48 the Supreme 
Court accepted this view and held it to be a violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment when imposition of “special assessments to meet the cost of 
public improvements . . . . [are] in substantial excess of the special 
benefits accruing” to the private owner.49
decisions interpreting the Takings Clause and concludes that “[t]he predecessor clauses to the Fifth 
Amendment’s Takings Clause, the original understanding of the Takings Clause itself, and the 
weight of early judicial interpretations of the federal and state takings clauses all indicate that 
compensation was mandated only when the government physically took property.” Id. at 798. 
41. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871). 
42. Id. at 167–69. 
43. Id. at 181. 
44. 123 U.S. 623 (1887). 
45. See id. at 653–57, 668–70. Justice Harlan, delivering the opinion of the Court, wrote that 
“[s]uch legislation does not disturb the owner in the control or use of his property for lawful 
purposes, nor restrict his right to dispose of it, but is only a declaration by the state that its use by 
any one, for certain forbidden purposes, is prejudicial to the public interest.” Id. at 669. 
46. Vill. of Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269, 279 (1898). 
47. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TAXATION, INCLUDING THE LAW OF
LOCAL ASSESSMENTS 661 (Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 2d ed. 1886). 
48. 172 U.S. 269 (1898). 
49. Id. at 278–79. 
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B.  Twentieth-Century Conception of Property 
As the century turned, so too did the jurisprudential concept of 
property. Blackstone’s definition of property required that an owner have 
“[s]ole and de[s]potic dominion”50 over a corporeal, physical asset. But 
under twentieth-century conditions, this definition proved to be 
anachronistically narrow.51 Blackstone’s view failed to account for 
intangible assets such as business goodwill, trademarks, trade secrets, 
and copyrights.52 Bills of exchange (“chose in action”), accounts 
receivable, and contract rights were being bought and sold 
notwithstanding the absence of any specific, underlying tangible asset. A 
creditor, for example, might assign his right to repayment of a debt to a 
buyer, who would then have enforceable property rights in the debtor’s 
obligation of contract. None of these transactions related to a physical 
“thing,” but all were treated by financial markets as creating valuable
interests. Moreover, real estate markets had severed usufructuary 
property interests from possessory property interests. The creation of 
easements and servitudes (“incorporeal hereditaments”) left the owner in 
possession with rights that were neither exclusive nor absolute. Perhaps 
it was these market realities that prompted a young Yale law professor 
named Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld to conclude that in the twentieth 
century, property was nothing more than a “very complex aggregate of 
rights . . . which . . . naturally have to do with the [asset] in question”53
and which might be separated and made distinct with a “freedom of 
alienation and circulation.”54
IV.  REGULATORY TAKINGS
A. Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon (1922) 
Perhaps Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. had 
Hohfeld’s “aggregate of rights” notion in mind when, in a 1922 letter to 
British political scientist Harold Laski, he lamented the “petty larceny of 
50. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 37, at 2. 
51. See Francis J. Swayze, The Growing Law, 25 YALE L.J. 1, 9–11 (1915); see also Kenneth 
J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Development of the Modern 
Concept of Property, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 325, 329–30 (1980). 
52. See, e.g., Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) (acknowledging a 
“quasi” property right in news matter that is distinguishable from unpublished works and upholding, 
on the basis of unfair competition, the district court’s injunction against the appropriating news 
agency). 
53. WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN
JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS 12 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1919). 
54. Id. at 105. 
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the police power.”55 Just months later, Justice Holmes would 
memorialize such sentiments in a landmark decision. 
In the case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,56 an 1878 deed had 
severed ownership of land between a surface owner and subsurface 
owner.57 The deed expressly provided that the surface owner waived all 
claims for damages that might arise from use of the subsurface, giving 
Pennsylvania Coal (the subsurface owner) the right to mine coal without 
regard for the condition on the surface.58 But in 1921, a surface owner 
(on the authority of a newly enacted Pennsylvania statute) obtained an 
injunction preventing the owner of the subsurface from mining in such a 
way as to cause subsidence.59
Justice Holmes pointed out that “‘[f]or practical purposes, the right 
to coal consists in the right to mine it.’”60 On the facts, he found that the 
statute made it commercially impracticable for the coal company to 
mine, and as a result it deprived the coal company of its entitlement.61
Moreover, the statute impaired the surface owner’s contractual obligation 
to assume the risk of damages arising from coal mining.62 Justice Holmes 
concluded that the “the statute . . . destroy[ed] previously existing rights 
of property and contract.”63
Justice Holmes looked to the facts to determine whether 
compensation was constitutionally required. He concluded for the 
majority that the diminution in value had reached such a “magnitude” 
that the police power was stretched “too far,” so as to amount to an 
unconstitutional taking of property under the Fourteenth Amendment in 
the absence of just compensation.64 Justice Holmes’s expansive view 
55. 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND 
HAROLD J. LASKI 1916–1935, at 457 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Harvard University Press 1953) 
[hereinafter HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS]. See also an excerpt from a letter from Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr. to Sir Frederick Pollock dated February 9, 1921, in which Holmes describes Hohfeld as 
“an ingenious gent, taking, as I judge from flying glimpses, pretty good and keen distinctions of the 
kind that are more needed by a lower grade of lawyer than they are by you and me.” 2 HOLMES-
POLLOCK LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND SIR FREDERICK 
POLLOCK, 1874–1935, at 63–64 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Harvard University Press 2d ed. 1961). 
56. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
57. See id. at 412. 
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 414 (quoting Commonwealth ex rel. Keator v. Clearview Coal Co., 100 A. 820, 820 
(1917)). 
61. See id. at 414–15. 
62. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922). 
63. Id. at 413. 
64. See id. at 413–16. 
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conflated property rights with obligations of contracts and required just 
compensation if either were impaired by government action.65
Justice Brandeis, in lone dissent, recalled the nineteenth-century 
understanding of “constitutional property” by observing that the coal 
beneath the surface remained in the exclusive possession of the coal 
company.66 It was not trespassed upon, appropriated, nor destroyed.67
The restriction was merely the prohibition of a creation of a nuisance.68
Therefore, Justice Brandeis argued, it was not compensable.69
Justice Brandeis’s dissent forewarned that under Justice Holmes’s 
expanded twentieth-century definition of property: “[e]very restriction 
upon the use of property imposed in the exercise of the police power 
deprives the owner of some right theretofore enjoyed, and is, in that 
sense, an abridgement by the State of rights in property without making 
compensation.”70 And as Justice Holmes’s majority opinion recognized, 
“[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to 
property could not be diminished without paying for every such change 
in the general law.”71 Perforce, it fell upon the Court in future cases to 
determine whether rights of property and contract must “yield to the 
police power” or whether legislatures had gone beyond their 
constitutional powers and stretched the police power “too far.”72 With 
those words, the concept of a “regulatory taking” of “constitutional 
property” was created.
B.  Regulatory Takings in the Supreme Court (1926–1962) 
 During the mid-twentieth century, the Supreme Court’s 
Fourteenth Amendment decisions were more concerned with personal 
liberties than with property rights.73 For the most part the Court abstained 
from considering regulatory takings claims, leaving it to the state courts to 
determine whether regulations had gone “too far.” But in a few of its cases, 
the Court laid down ground rules for judicial review. 
65. Compare with U.S. CONST. Art. VI, cl. 2 and accompanying text. 
66. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 417 (1922). 
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 422. 
70. Id. at 417. 
71. Id. at 413. 
72. Id. at 412, 415. 
73. But see Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972) (“That rights in 
property are basic civil rights has long been recognized.”).
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1.  The usual presumption of constitutionality 
The beginning of the twentieth century witnessed the growth of a 
“progressive” political and social movement. Participating state 
legislatures passed laws that promised to promote the general welfare by 
aggressively regulating and restricting economic activity.74 When 
overseeing the constitutionality of these laws, the Supreme Court had to 
first decide upon an appropriate standard of judicial review. 
In the 1926 case, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,75 the 
Supreme Court ruled that its standard of review would be deferential; 
laws should only be declared unconstitutional upon a finding that their 
“provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial 
relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.”76 After 
adopting this “presumption of constitutionality”77 the Court legitimized a 
comprehensive building zone law which, as applied, reduced the market 
value of an owner’s property by approximately seventy-five percent.78
Two years later in Nectow v. City of Cambridge,79 the Court 
reaffirmed the proposition that it would not set aside a public choice 
unless it was clear that the regulator’s actions had no “foundation in 
reason.”80 But it then struck down a residential-use-only classification on 
property after accepting the master in chancery’s factual findings that the 
restriction had no substantial relationship to “the health, safety, 
convenience, and general welfare of the inhabitants of that . . .
city . . . .”81 Hence, the presumption of constitutionality could be rebutted 
by detailed fact-specific analysis. 
2.  Utilitarian comparison of public benefit and private loss
When engaging in a fact-specific inquiry to determine whether the 
police power had been stretched “too far,” the Supreme Court’s mode of 
analysis was to balance public benefits against private loss. When the 
government was responding to a substantial threat to public health and 
safety, the precedents—borrowed from tort law—tipped the balance to 
74. See Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas,
CATO SUP. CT. REV., 2002–2003, at 21–22, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/scr/2003/ 
revolution.pdf. 
75. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
76. Id. at 395. 
77. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962). 
78. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 384. 
79. 277 U.S. 183 (1928). 
80. Id. at 187. 
81. Id.
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the public’s side and excused any requirement that compensation be paid 
to the private losers. For example, the government was excused from any 
obligation to compensate when it destroyed buildings to prevent the 
spread of fire82 and destroyed bridges out of necessity during the Civil 
War.83 A similar excuse was extended to air pollution controls that 
abated “noxious uses” when, for instance, the government closed down a 
fertilizer plant84 and a brickyard,85 notwithstanding the private loss to the 
owners. And in Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,86 the Court upheld as a 
public safety measure an ordinance that shut down a landowner’s quarry 
operation within town limits.87
On occasion, however, the Supreme Court has taken this benefit 
analysis a step further and permitted state governments to make a public 
choice between incompatible land uses on purely economic grounds. For 
example, Virginia passed legislation in 1920 ordering the cutting down 
of property owners’ cedar trees as a means of preventing the spread of a 
plant disease to the state’s apple orchards.88 The Court in Miller v. 
Schoene89 held that the “state [had] not exceed[ed] its constitutional 
powers by deciding upon the destruction of one class of property in order 
to save another which, in the judgment of the legislature, is of greater 
value to the public.”90 “Preferment of [the public] interest over the 
property interest of the individual,” the Court reasoned, “is one of the 
distinguishing characteristics of every exercise of the police power which 
affects property.”91
Although the Constitution had not delegated the police power to 
Congress,92 its exercise of other “necessary and proper”93 powers might 
nonetheless diminish the value of private property. The presumption of 
constitutionality was said to extend to actions by the national government,94
but this presumption was left unmentioned in the several cases involving 
82. See Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16 (1879). 
83. See United States v. Pac. R.R., 120 U.S. 227 (1887). 
84. See Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659 (1878). 
85. See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915). 
86. 369 U.S. 590 (1962). 
87. Id. at 590–91. 
88. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 277 (1928). 
89. Id.
90. Id. at 279. 
91. Id. at 280. 
92. The text proves too much. Congress does have an inherent police power in federal 
territories and the District of Columbia. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923), 
overruled on other grounds; W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
93. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
94. Adkins, 261 U.S. at 544 (“This court, by an unbroken line of decisions from Chief Justice 
Marshall to the present day, has steadily adhered to the rule that every possible presumption is in favor of 
the validity of an act of Congress until overcome beyond rational doubt.”).
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private losses caused by the federal government’s pursuit of business 
activities. For example, in United States v. Causby,95 the Court considered 
the legal liability of the United States for its low-altitude military flights 
into the private airspace over a chicken farm, which frightened one-
hundred fifty chickens to death.96 The Federal Torts Claims Act had not 
yet been enacted, thereby protecting the United States under sovereign 
immunity from tort liability for nuisance or trespass, but the Court 
treated the low-altitude flights as the taking of an easement through the 
property owners’ superadjacent airspace and awarded him the right to 
just compensation.97
In the 1960 case of Armstrong v. United States,98 the United States 
confiscated and claimed clear title to the work in progress under a 
military contract between the U.S. Navy and a defaulting ship builder.99
By doing so, the United States extinguished the liens held by 
materialmen that would have had priority under state law.100 These 
lienholders were foreclosed by the doctrine of sovereign immunity from 
directly enforcing their liens against the federal government, but after 
considering the circumstances, the Court determined that the United 
States had unconstitutionally taken the lienholders intangible property 
and ordered payment of just compensation.101 In explaining the Court’s 
reasoning, Justice Black articulated what has come to be known as the 
“Armstrong principle”102: “[t]he Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that 
private property shall not be taken for a public use without just 
compensation was designed to bar Government from forcing some 
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, 
should be borne by the public as a whole.”103
In Causby and Armstrong, the federal government was not using its 
regulatory power to promote the public health, safety, and general welfare. 
It was instead acting as an enterpriser and market participant in the 
fulfillment of other “necessary and proper” powers. Under these 
circumstances, the Court was inclined to make the federal government pay 
compensation to the private losers.104
95. 328 U.S. 256 (1946). 
96. Id. at 258–59. 
97. Id. at 261–62. The “self-executing” character of the Fifth Amendment has been held to trump 
the sovereign immunity doctrine. See, e.g., United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253 (1980). 
98. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
99. Id. at 41. 
100. Id. at 41–42. 
101. Id. at 46–49. 
102. See e,g., William M. Treanor, The Armstrong Principle, the Narratives of Takings, and 
Compensation Statutes, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1151 (1997). 
103. Id. at 49.
104. See Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 61–64, 67–69 (1964). 
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C.  The Burger Court (1969–1986) 
At the start of the tenure of Chief Justice Warren Burger in 1969, the 
U.S. Supreme Court found itself with a “crazy-quilt pattern of Supreme 
Court doctrine”105 to stitch upon. The members of the Burger had very 
diverse political views, ranging from liberal activists William Brennan 
and Thurgood Marshall on the left, to a practitioner of judicial restraint, 
John M. Harlan, on the right. But with respect to the regulatory takings 
question, the Court did not ideologically divide into two blocs. Instead, 
its decisions were moderated by a centrist majority of non-doctrinaire 
pragmatists.106 The precedents suggested that the constitutional review of 
government regulations should be procedurally deferential but 
substantively open-ended. Under the standard of judicial review, a 
“presumption of reasonableness [was] with the State.”107 If the Court 
chose to overcome the presumption, it could, after a utilitarian 
comparison of public benefit and private loss, determine whether 
“fairness and justice” required that the costs should be borne by the 
public at large.108
But in 1972, when William Rehnquist replaced Justice Harlan on the 
Court, there was a new voice on the Court with respect to regulatory 
takings. Justice Rehnquist is now remembered as a conservative jurist 
and as a practitioner of judicial restraint who, as Chief Justice, sought 
compromise to reach a broad majority on contentious issues. But this 
reputation is inconsistent with his opinions in regulatory takings cases. 
He re-opened the regulatory takings debate, and over his thirty-three-year 
tenure he fervently argued in scores of cases that regulators were going 
Sax theorized: 
[W]hen economic loss is incurred as a result of government enhancement of its resource 
position in its enterprise capacity, then compensation is constitutionally required . . . . But 
losses, however severe, incurred as a consequence of government acting merely in its 
arbitral capacity are to be viewed as a non-compensable exercise of the police power. 
Id. at 63. 
105. Allison Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme 
Court Expropriation Law, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 63, 63. 
106. The centrist justices were Lewis Powell, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Byron 
White, and Potter Stewart. This description of the Burger Court is supported throughout THE
OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 
2d ed. 2005). 
107. See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 596 (1962) (citing Salsburg v. 
Maryland, 346 U.S. 545, 554 (1954)). 
108. See, e.g., Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49. But cf. U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 
U.S. 1, 29 (1976) (“We do not accept this invitation to engage in a utilitarian comparison of public 
benefit and private loss.”).
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beyond their constitutional powers. In majority and dissent, Rehnquist 
proved to be a relentless and almost unwavering judicial activist when it 
came to the defense of constitutional property.109
1. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York 
Justice Rehnquist first voiced his constitutional defense of private 
property in the landmark case of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. 
New York City.110 Therein the City’s historic preservation commission 
had denied Penn Central Railroad permission to construct a skyscraper 
atop Grand Central Station, a 1913 architectural landmark.111 The 
magnitude of Penn Central’s economic loss was significant. As a result 
of the railroad’s inability to develop this air space, it forfeited a lease 
with a capitalized value of approximately $40 million.112 On the other 
hand, Penn Central was left with a reasonable, beneficial use of the 
station that was consistent with its original investment-backed 
expectations.113 The substantial increase in value of the air space was a 
result of its serendipitous location at the nation’s economic and 
commercial hub, rather than a product of the railroad’s initiative or 
109. Rehnquist defended an expansive constitutional notion of private property rights by 
voting with the majority in the following cases: Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001); 
City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1999); E. Enters. v. Apfel, 
524 U.S. 498 (1998) (plurality opinion); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas v. S.C. 
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First 
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); Ruckelshaus 
v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987); Loretto v. 
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. 
Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); United States v. 
Clarke, 445 U.S. 253 (1980). He voted with the dissenters in the following cases: Brown v. Legal 
Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216 (2003); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning 
Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987);
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340 (1986); and Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. 
City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104 (1978). In only two cases did he openly agree with the legitimacy of 
challenged regulations on the merits: Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S 74 (1980), and 
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979). 
110. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). The opinion of the Court was delivered by Justice Brennan. 
111. Id. at 115–17. 
112. The Court explained how Penn Central planned to increase its income: 
Penn Central . . . entered into a renewable 50-year lease and sublease agreement with 
appellant UGP Properties, Inc. (UGP) . . . . Under the terms of the agreement, UGP was 
to construct a multistory office building above the Terminal. UGP promised to pay Penn 
Central $1 million annually during construction and at least $3 million annually 
thereafter. The rentals would be offset in part by a loss of some $700,000 to $1 million in 
net rentals presently received from concessionaires displaced by the new building. 
Id. at 116. 
113. Id. at 136. 
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speculative acumen. And the character of the restriction was principled 
and non-invasive—the architecturally iconic Grand Central Station was 
left physically intact and under the ownership of the Penn Central 
Railroad.114 The Court’s majority115 indulged in the customary 
presumption of constitutionality and upheld the landmark designation 
after engaging in this ad hoc fact-specific analysis. 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist (joined by Chief Justice 
Burger and Justice Stevens) reminded the majority that the U.S. Supreme 
Court had come to recognize that  
the term “property” as used in the Taking Clause includes the entire 
“group of rights inhering in the citizen’s [ownership].” The term is not 
used in the “vulgar and untechnical sense of the physical thing with 
respect to which the citizen exercises rights recognized by law. 
[Instead, it] . . . denote[s] the group of rights inhering in the citizen’s 
relation to the physical THING, AS THE RIGHT TO POSSESS, USE 
AND DISPOSE OF IT. . . . [T]he constitutional provision is addressed 
to every sort of interest the citizen may possess.”116
Justice Rehnquist pointed out that New York City had “destroyed—in a 
literal sense, ‘taken’—substantial property rights of Penn Central.”117 He 
reminded the majority that “a multimillion dollar loss has been imposed 
on [Penn Central] . . . . for the general benefit of all [New York City’s] 
people,” and that “[i]t [was] exactly this imposition of general costs on a 
few individuals at which the ‘taking’ protection [was] directed.”118 In 
Justice Rehnquist the Court now had a member who was ideologically 
devoted to the defense of “constitutional property.”
2.  Post-Penn Central decisions (1978–1986) 
The Penn Central decision signaled an upsurge in the Court’s 
interest in “constitutional property.” Between 1978 and Chief Justice 
Burger’s retirement in 1986, the Court considered more than ten 
regulatory takings cases.119 During these years the Court continued to 
114. Id. at 136–38. 
115. Written by Justice Brennan and joined by Justices Stewart, White, Marshall, Blackmun, 
and Powell. 
116. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 142–43 (emphasis and alterations in original) (citations omitted). 
117. Id. at 143. 
118. Id. at 147. 
119. See generally, e.g., MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340 (1986); 
Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 
(1985); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan 
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pay lip service to a presumption of constitutionality but sometimes 
overcame that presumption and found a “taking” on the merits after “a 
weighing of private and public interests.”120
Pennsylvania Coal had considered the “extent of the diminution” in 
value of the property to be the most important fact to be considered when 
determining whether “there must be an exercise of the power of eminent 
domain and compensation” to sustain a regulation.121 But unanswered 
questions made the measurement of the magnitude of the owners’ loss 
hopelessly problematic. 
Because, as Justice Brandeis had observed in his dissent in 
Pennsylvania Coal, “values are relative,”122 the physical segment of 
property subject to the magnitude measure would often prove the 
difference when determining whether the regulation had gone “too far.” 
For example, after dividing the physical dimension of the land between 
surface and subsurface, Justice Holmes’s majority opinion treated the 
prohibition on mining as if it amounted to a 100 percent diminution of 
the economic value of the subsurface coal seam. Justice Brandeis, on the 
other hand, answered that the economic impact was not excessive when 
measured against the value of the “whole property” (surface and 
subsurface).123
Likewise, in Penn Central, the majority and the dissent measured the 
magnitude of the loss against different physical segments. The majority 
opinion noted that the landmark designation retained the economic value 
of Grand Central Station and left the subsurface rail yards 
undiminished.124 Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, argued that there had been 
a 100 percent diminution in the value of the air rights above the 
station.125
Moreover, since private property was nothing more than an 
“aggregate of rights”126 that may be separated and made distinct,127 what 
if a regulation took some of the owner’s rights but left the others intact? 
The Burger Court struggled to answer this question with the metaphor of 
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 
(1981); Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980); Agins v. City of 
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S 74 (1980); Kaiser Aetna 
v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979); Lake Country Estates, 
Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1978). 
120. Agins, 447 U.S. at 261. 
121. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). 
122. Id. at 419. 
123. Id. at 419–20. 
124. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 136–38 (1978). 
125. Id. at 146. 
126. HOHFELD, supra note 53, at 12. 
127. Id. at 92. 
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the “bundle of sticks.”128 The sticks in the bundle were said to be the 
various functions that might be served by the underlying property 
resource—they included the right to exclusive use, the right to income, 
the right to transfer in whole or in part during life, and the right to 
transfer at death.129
The use of the “bundle of sticks” metaphor proved more obfuscatory 
than explanatory. Two cases from the 1979 Term of Court illustrate the 
point. In Kaiser Aetna v. United States,130 Justice Rehnquist considered 
the legitimacy of a U.S. Army Corps of Engineers regulation requiring a 
public access to a privately-titled tidal lagoon.131 He focused upon the 
“essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized 
as property . . . .”132 Speaking for a six-member majority he discounted 
the long-established precedent that gave the federal government free 
navigation servitude over all tidal waters.133 He concluded, without 
explanation or citation, that the “right to exclude” was “so universally 
held to be a fundamental element of the property right” that its 
infringement constituted a regulatory taking regardless of the benefits to 
the public.134
The result of Kaiser Aetna seems problematic on all counts. The 
magnitude of the landowners’ actual loss seems small. Since free public 
access to navigable tidewaters had been a background common law 
principle for over four hundred years, the reasonable expectations of the 
landowner were much in doubt. And the regulation could be literally and 
accurately characterized as promoting the best interest of the general 
public. Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall dissented.135
In Andrus v. Allard,136 the Court considered the constitutionality of a 
federal regulation that prohibited commercial transactions in ceremonial 
Indian artifacts composed of eagle feathers or talons.137 The plaintiff was 
a retail trader with an inventory of “pre-existing” legally acquired 
headdresses, amulets, and necklaces; shut down and put out of business, 
he challenged the regulation as a Fifth Amendment taking of his 
128. E.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); Kaiser 
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979). 
129. Id.
130. 444 U.S. 164 (1979). 
131. Id. at 166–69. 
132. Id. at 176. Such sticks are said to include rights to: exclusive possession, exclusive use, 
income and enjoyment, and transfer the res in whole or part, during life or at death. 
133. Id. at 181–87 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
134. Id. at 179–80 (Rehnquist, J., majority). 
135. Id. at 180. 
136. 444 U.S. 51 (1979). 
137. Id. at 53–55. 
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property.138 Justice Brennan, speaking for the majority of the Court, 
disagreed: 
[A] significant restriction has been imposed on one means of disposing 
of the artifacts. But the denial of one traditional property right does not 
always amount to a taking. At least where an owner possesses a full 
“bundle” of property rights, the destruction of one “strand” of the 
bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its 
entirety.139
Justice Brennan considered it crucial in this case that the retail dealer 
retained “the rights to possess and transport their property, and to donate 
or devise the protected birds.”140 Justice Brennan, without dissent from 
the other justices (including Justice Rehnquist), wrote off the dealer’s 
loss as “the advantage of living and doing business in a civilized 
community.”141
Although Andrus reached a conclusion opposite the one in Kaiser 
Aetna, the decision seems just as problematic. The magnitude of the 
dealer’s economic loss seems total, and it was of no solace to the trader 
that he retained personal safe-keeping of his retail inventory. The 
outcomes of the decisions were unpredictable and—some would say—
unprincipled and unfair. 
Three years later in 1982 the Court used the “bundle of sticks” 
metaphor once more, but this time to justify a change in its mode of 
analysis. In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,142 a New 
York law authorized a cable television company to install cable 
equipment on private property.143 The intrusion into the owner’s property 
was economically and aesthetically insignificant while the advantage to 
the community was substantial.144 Speaking for the majority, Justice 
Marshall (rather than engaging in an ad hoc factual analysis that 
balanced the private loss against the public benefit) held “that a 
permanent physical occupation authorized by government is a taking 
without regard to the public interests that it may serve.”145 His only 
explanation for this new per se rule was that: “[T]he government does 
138. Id. at 54–55. 
139. Id. at 65–66 (citations omitted). 
140. Id. at 66. 
141. Id. at 67 (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 422 (1922) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting)). 
142. 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
143. See id. at 421. 
144. Id. at 421–24. 
145. Id. at 426. 
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not simply take a single ‘strand’ from the ‘bundle’ of property rights: it 
chops through the bundle, taking a slice of every strand.”146 The property 
owner seems to have suffered no significant economic loss, and the 
general public interest was well served. As observed by Justice 
Blackmun in his dissent, this “curiously anachronistic decision” reduced 
the “constitutional issue to formalistic quibble.”147
No authority or reason is provided for the aggrandizement of the 
“right to exclude” in Kaiser Aetna and Loretto, nor is any authority or 
reason provided for the minimization of the “right to income” in Andrus.
The trope of the “bundle” proved more a rationalization and less a 
ratiocination. Or in the wise words of Judge Benjamin Cardozo: 
“Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to 
liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it.”148
The Burger Court left one more nagging question unanswered, 
namely what remedies are available to the property owner when the 
Court finds that there has in fact been a regulatory taking? The courts in 
the states of New York and California had taken the position that the 
property owner was limited to declarative or injunctive relief and had 
denied compensatory relief. In three cases the majority on the Burger 
Court used a procedural ruse to avoid providing an answer to the damage 
question.149 The Court required proof of a “final decision regarding the 
application of the [regulation] to its property” as a prerequisite of 
assertion of a regulatory taking claim.150 But since the claimant might 
almost always apply for additional reconsideration or a variance, “[the] 
final and authoritative determination of the type and intensity of 
development legally permitted” was hard to come by.151
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County152 was the last 
regulatory takings case that Chief Justice Burger considered. In the 
majority opinion, Justice Stevens summarized the nature of regulatory 
takings jurisprudence of the Burger Court as follows: 
To this day we have no “set formula to determine where regulation 
ends and taking begins.” Instead, we rely “as much [on] the exercise of 
146. Id. at 435. 
147. Id. at 442. Justice Blackmun was joined in his dissent by Justices Brennan and White. 
The “formalistic quibble” language is borrowed from Sax, supra note 104, at 37. 
148. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926). 
149. See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340 (1986); Williamson 
County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); Agins v. 
City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). 
150. Williamson, 473 U.S. at 186. 
151. MacDonald, 477 U.S. at 348. 
152. 477 U.S. 340. Chief Justice Burger joined Justice White’s dissenting opinion. 
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judgment as [on] the application of logic.” Our cases have accordingly 
“examined the ‘taking’ question by engaging in essentially ad hoc, 
factual inquiries that have identified several factors—such as the 
economic impact of the regulation, its interference with reasonable 
investment-backed expectations, and the character of the governmental 
action—that have particular significance.”153
The “genius of the common law”154 system offered optimism that the 
nine justices of the Burger Court could, by “sticking close to [the] facts 
[instead of] relying upon overarching generalizations” eventually foster 
and develop a just and predictable body of law “case-by-case, . . . one-
step-at-a-time.” 155 But this had not proven to be true. Even though the 
justices more or less agreed on the standard of review and the mode of 
analysis, the results of the takings cases were left in a “mess”156 and a 
“muddle,”157 neither foreseeable nor fair. 
D.  The Rehnquist Court (1986–2005) 
In September of 1986, Chief Justice Warren Burger resigned and 
President Ronald Reagan appointed Associate Justice William H. 
Rehnquist as the sixteenth Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.158 Judge 
Antonin Scalia was appointed Associate Justice to fill the seat vacated by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist.159 President Reagan touted his new appointees 
as champions of “judicial restraint.”160 The Court’s altered membership 
would prove to have a profound effect on the law of regulatory takings. 
153. Id. at 348–49 (alterations in original) (citations omitted). 
154. See generally SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE GENIUS OF THE COMMON LAW (1912). 
155. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1177 
(1989). But cf. K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 56–69 (1960) 
(discussing the case system and precedent and concluding that “[p]eople . . . who think that 
precedent produces or ever did produce a certainty that did not involve matters of judgment and of
persuasion . . . simply do not know our system of precedent in which they live”).
156. Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice and Just Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 279, 279 
(1992) (citations omitted). 
157. See generally Carol M. Rose, Mahon, Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a 
Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561 (1984). 
158. See the address of former Chief Justice Warren Burger upon the appointment of Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Associate Justice Antonin Scalia, in 478 U.S. REP., at vii–ix (1989). 
159. Id.
160. Speech by President Ronald Reagan at the Swearing in of Chief Justice William H. 
Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia at the White House (Sept. 26, 1986), in ORIGINALISM: A
QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE 95, 97 (Steven G. Calabresi ed., 2007) (“Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justice Scalia have demonstrated in their opinions that they stand with Holmes and Frankfurter 
on [judicial restraint]. I nominated them with this principle very much in mind. And Chief Justice 
Burger, in his opinions, was also a champion of restraint.”).
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Throughout his previous fourteen years on the Court, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist had been a strong proponent of constitutional property rights. 
Now, in Justice Scalia he found a fellow conservative with a similar 
distrust of government. Together they would undertake to find the cases, 
and the votes, to change the constitutional law. During the next two 
decades, in at least eleven decisions,161 the Rehnquist Court would divide 
and come together, and disagree and agree over whether regulations were 
“forcing some individuals to bear burdens which, in all fairness, should 
be borne by the public as a whole.”162
The regulatory takings jurisprudence that the Rehnquist Court had 
inherited from the Burger Court had two basic aspects: a standard of 
judicial review and a mode of analysis. Those precedents established a 
deferential standard of judicial review of the constitutionality of 
exercises of the police power: “The presumption of reasonableness is 
with the State,”163 or the “exercise of police power will be upheld if any 
state of facts either known or which could be reasonably assumed affords 
support for it.”164 One exception had been judicially created—if the 
exercise of the police power authorized “a permanent physical 
occupation” of the property, then the presumption was reversed and the 
government action was a “taking without regard to the public interests 
that it may serve.”165
The principle of stare decisis mandated a multi-factor mode of 
analysis. In the words of Justice Blackmun: 
As has been admitted on numerous occasions, “this Court has 
generally ‘been unable to develop any “set formula” for determining 
when “justice and fairness” require that economic injuries caused by 
public action’” must be deemed a compensable taking. The inquiry into 
whether a taking has occurred is essentially an “ad hoc, factual” 
inquiry. The Court, however, has identified several factors that should 
161. See Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216 (2003); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 
Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 
(2001); City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1999); E. Enters. v. 
Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998) (plurality opinion); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas 
v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988); 
Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. 
County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 
U.S. 470 (1987). 
162. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 656 (1981) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)). 
163. See, e.g., Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545, 553 (1954). 
164. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 596 (1962) (citing United States v. 
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938)). Also, see Goldblatt generally for a summary of the 
regulatory takings precedents. 
165. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982). 
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be taken into account when determining whether a governmental action
has gone beyond “regulation” and effects a “taking.”166
Justice Scalia challenged these propositions in both theory and 
practice. In the 1989 Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. Lecture at Harvard Law 
School, he questioned the legitimacy of judicial discretion. After 
“explor[ing] the dichotomy between general rules and personal discretion 
within the narrow context of law that is made by the courts,”167 he 
concluded that it was “[m]uch better . . . to have a clear, previously 
enunciated rule that one can point to in explanation of the decision.”168
He preferred a mode of analysis with “clear and definite rules”169 rather 
than “standardless balancing”170 so as to promote both the appearance 
and reality of equal treatment and a “Rule of Law.”171 And years later on 
the speaker’s circuit, Justice Scalia questioned the presumption of 
constitutionality. He was heard to say: 
My Court is fond of saying that acts of Congress [or the state 
legislature or town council] come to the Court with the presumption of 
constitutionality. That presumption reflects [the legislative body’s] 
status as a co-equal branch of government with its own responsibilities 
to the Constitution. But if [the legislature] is going to take the attitude 
that it will do anything it can get away with and let the Supreme Court 
worry about the Constitution . . . then perhaps that presumption is 
unwarranted.172
Justice Scalia’s “theory” of judicial review favored a close oversight of 
public actions to ensure that officials were comporting with the clear and 
definite principles of constitutional law. “There are times,” he observed, 
“when even a bad rule is better than no rule at all.”173
166. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984) (citations omitted). 
167. Scalia, supra note 155, at 1176 (emphasis in original). Justice Scalia’s essay was first 
delivered on February 14, 1989 at Harvard University as the Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. Lecture. 
168. Id. at 1178. 
169. Id. at 1183. 
170. Id. at 1185. 
171. See id. at 1176–79. 
172. THE REHNQUIST LEGACY 284 (Craig M. Bradley ed., 2006) (quoting Justice Scalia based 
upon a transcription from a videotape at the Telecommunications Law and Policy Symposium on 
April 18, 2000). 
173. Scalia, supra note 155, at 1179. 
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1. The Supreme Court’s 1986 October term
At the Supreme Court’s 1986 October term, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justice Scalia wasted no time in their efforts to reform the regulatory 
takings jurisprudence of the Burger Court. In Nollan v. California 
Coastal Commission,174 Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and three other justices in holding that the regulatory 
commission’s attempt to exact an easement across a private beachfront in 
return for the issuance of a building permit was an unconstitutional 
taking.175 He convincingly argued that when this kind of “leveraging of 
the police power” was attempted, the burden of proof for an “essential 
nexus” should be shifted to the government.176 In this context, at least, 
Justice Scalia had accomplished his goal of eliminating the presumption 
of constitutionality. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and Blackmun 
dissented.177
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion in First English 
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles178 (with Justice 
Scalia and four other justices in concurrence) closed the loophole that 
allowed regulators in New York and California to impose excessive 
controls with impunity. Since the courts in those states had understood 
the Fourteenth Amendment to only allow for “invalidation 
unaccompanied by payment of damages,”179 their overzealous regulators 
had little to lose. Even if the disappointed property owner paid the 
“transaction costs” necessary to win his regulatory takings lawsuit, the 
government agency faced no threat of economic loss.180 First English 
Evangelical Lutheran Church changed that by establishing that the states 
could not constitutionally limit the remedy for a taking to declarative 
relief; thereafter, if the overzealous regulator repealed the offending law 
it still owed monetary damages for the “temporary taking” during its 
period of enforcement.181 This threat of damages effectively discouraged 
the regulators from engaging in the scofflaw strategy of simply replacing 
174. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
175. See id. at 837–41. 
176. Id. at 837 n.5. 
177. Three separate dissenting opinions were filed. Justice Brennan’s dissent was joined by 
Justice Marshall. Id. at 842. Justice Blackmun filed a separate dissenting opinion, and also joined the 
dissent of Justice Stevens. Id. at 865–66. 
178. 482 U.S. 304 (1987). 
179. See, e.g., San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 655 (1981) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). (“Invalidation unaccompanied by payment of damages would hardly 
compensate the landowner for any economic loss suffered during the time his property was taken.”).
180. See id.
181. First English, 482 U.S. at 306, 318–19. 
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any invalidated regulation with another unconstitutional enactment.182
Three justices dissented, arguing that the risk of damages in the uncertain 
world of regulatory takings would have a chilling effect on the enactment 
of legitimate regulation.183
In the third test case from the 1986 Term, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justice Scalia would suffer a setback. Keystone Bituminous Coal 
Ass’n v. DeBenedictis184 was a carbon copy of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. 
Mahon.185 Once again the Pennsylvania legislature had prohibited the 
mining of coal by means that could result in subsidence of the surface.186
And once again an owner of the underground coal sued, alleging an 
unconstitutional taking of its property.187 A majority of five held, after 
engaging in an ad hoc factual analysis, that the magnitude of the owner’s 
loss was small relative to his overall holding of underground coal; the 
Commonwealth’s interest in protecting against environmental damage 
was strong, and, therefore, the regulation did not go “too far” and no 
compensation was due.188 In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
Scalia were only able to convince two other justices to join with them in 
treating the twenty-seven million tons of coal that the act required to be 
left in place as a separate property interest that had been totally taken.189
182. Justice Brennan provided an interesting example of this strategy in his dissent in San 
Diego, 450 U.S. at 655 n.22: 
At the 1974 annual conference of the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers in 
California, a California City Attorney gave fellow City Attorneys the following advice:  
  “IF ALL ELSE FAILS, MERELY AMEND THE REGULATION AND START 
OVER AGAIN. If legal preventive maintenance does not work, and you still receive a 
claim attacking the land use regulation, or if you try the case and lose, don’t worry about 
it. All is not lost. . . . [T]he City [can] change the regulation in question, even after trial 
and judgment, make it more reasonable, more restrictive, or whatever, and everybody 
starts over again.”
183. See the dissent of Justices Stevens, Blackmun, and O’ Connor in First English. 482 U.S. 
at 340. 
184. 480 U.S. 470 (1987). 
185. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
186. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 474. 
187. Id. at 478–79. 
188. Id. at 485–88, 492–99. 
189. Justices Powell and O’Connor joined Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia in the 
dissent, id. at 506, and agreed that the 27 million tons of coal left in place constituted a taking, even 
if it was accomplished by regulatory action rather than physical invasion, id. at 515–16. 
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2. Lucas v. South Carolina 
In 1991 the conservative Clarence Thomas was appointed to fill the 
seat left vacant on the Supreme Court by the resignation of the liberal 
Justice Thurgood Marshall. Justice Thomas’s appointment enabled 
Justice Scalia to gain the majority’s approval in supplanting the 
“standardless balancing” law of regulatory takings with a new “clear and 
definite rule.”190 In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,191 the 
South Carolina trial court had found that a prohibition on construction on 
the beach “‘deprive[d] Lucas of any reasonable economic use of the 
lots . . . .’”192 On certiorari, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion193 accepted 
this fact-finding and by doing so accomplished two of his goals for the 
law of regulatory takings (1) it defined a new bright-line “categor[y] of 
regulatory action as compensable without [regard] into the public interest 
advanced;”194 and (2) it eliminated (more or less) an old fact-specific rule 
that gave jurists too much “personal discretion to do justice.”195 In the 
past, “the severity of the burden that government impose[d] upon private 
property rights” had always been considered the most important factor in 
determining whether a regulation went “too far.”196 Justice Scalia 
convinced four of his colleagues to join with him in holding a “total 
takings” to be per se compensable.197 In dissent, Justice Blackmun 
criticized the majority for creating a new “categorical rule” not “rooted 
in our prior case law, common law, or common sense” to “decide such a 
narrow case.”198 He feared that “the Court’s new policies [would] spread 
beyond the narrow confines of the present case.”199 This kind of 
predicted judicial expansion appears to have been the shared goal of 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas. 
190. See Scalia, supra note 155, at 1183–85. 
191. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
192. Id. at 1009 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
193. Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, O’Connor, and 
Thomas. Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment. Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter would 
avoided the decision on procedural grounds. Justice Blackmun states, for instance, “[m]y 
disagreement with the Court begins with its decision to review this case. This court has held 
consistently that a land-use challenge is not ripe for review until there is a final decision about what 
uses of the property will be permitted.” Id. at 1041. 
194. Id. at 1015 (describing how the Court has used a “set formula” in only two categories of 
regulatory takings). 
195. Scalia, supra note 155, at 1176. 
196. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005). 
197. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 (“We think . . . that there are good reasons for our frequently 
expressed belief that when the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all 
economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, . . . he has suffered a taking.”). 
198. Id. at 1036. 
199. Id.
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Of perhaps more importance than the new categorical rule was 
Justice Scalia’s disregard of the doctrine of stare decisis. The Petitioner
Lucas had never challenged the legislative finding that a building ban 
was necessary to prevent serious harm to property and life. And the 
Court’s precedents had persistently and consistently held that “when a 
regulation respecting the use of property [was] designed ‘to prevent 
serious public harm,’ no compensation [was] ow[ed] under the Takings 
Clause regardless of the regulation’s effect on the property’s value.”200
Justice Scalia recognized that a number of prior Supreme Court opinions 
had suggested that “‘harmful or noxious uses’ of property may be 
proscribed by government regulation without the requirement of 
compensation.”201 But his majority opinion discounted these precedents 
and instead found that such “noxious-use logic cannot serve as a 
touchstone to distinguish regulatory ‘takings’—which require 
compensation—from regulatory deprivations that do not require 
compensation”202 because of the absence of “an objective, value-free 
basis”203 for contra-distinguishing between “‘harm-preventing’ and 
‘benefit-conferring’”204 regulations. 
In a single case, Justice Scalia had crafted an opinion that both 
created a new bright-line limitation on the police powers of government 
and eliminated an old line of precedents conferring discretionary powers 
on judges to make exceptions to the requirements of the Takings Clause. 
His opinion did, however, admit to one exception to his per se rule 
requiring compensation for “total takings.” No compensation need be 
paid, he said, if the “limitation . . . newly legislated or decreed (without 
compensation) . . . inhere[d] in the title itself, in the restrictions that 
background principles of the State’s law of property and nuisance 
already place upon land ownership.”205 But the “originalist” cast of this 
rhetoric seems designed to keep the exception a dead letter and a closed 
category. For example, the filling of wetlands in the eighteenth century 
served the public interest by eliminating malarial marsh; by contrast, the 
filling of wetlands in the twentieth century is understood to destroy vital 
200. Id. at 1010 (citing the Supreme Court of South Carolina’s ruling in Lucas prior to review 
by the Court). See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (law effectively preventing 
continued operation of quarry that presented a safety risk to nearby residents); Miller v. Schoene,
276 U.S. 272 (1928) (order to destroy diseased cedar trees to prevent infection of nearby orchards); 
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (law barring operation of brick mill in residential 
area); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (law prohibiting manufacture of alcoholic beverages). 
201. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1022. 
202. Id. at 1026. 
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1024. 
205. Id. at 1029. 
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ecosystems. A regulator, to avail itself of the exception, might have to 
show that the regulated practice was understood to be a “nuisance” when 
the title originated in the eighteenth or nineteenth century; it might not be 
enough to show that the regulation was designed to curtail a noxious use 
or to prevent serious harm under the conditions of today. Whether the 
Court will be forward-looking or backward-looking in its understanding 
of this exception remains to be seen. 
3.  Post-Lucas takings jurisprudence (1992–2005) 
In the post-Lucas era the law of regulatory takings had come to be an 
admixture of categorical rules and ad hoc balances. According to Loretto,
regulations resulting in the “permanent physical occupation” of private 
property were per se compensable.206 And in his majority opinion in 
Dolan v. City of Tigard,207 Chief Justice Rehnquist held that when the 
police power came with a demand for the exchange of money or property 
in return for regulatory approval, then the ordinary presumption of 
constitutionality was reversed, and the burden of proof was placed on the 
government to show that the exacted condition was related in a “‘rough 
proportionality’ . . . to the impact of the proposed development.” 208
Justices Stevens, Blackmun, and Ginsburg dissented from the majority’s 
“abandon[ment of] the traditional presumption of constitutionality” and 
“resurrection of a species of substantive due process analysis that [the 
Court] firmly rejected decades ago.”209 Finally, according to Scalia’s 
majority opinion in Lucas, compensation was categorically required 
where “regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of 
land.”210
Seven years after the ruling in Lucas, the Court considered the 
appropriate judicial process for a “total taking” finding. In City of 
Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.,211 a split and splintered 
Court held that the jury could reasonably find that “a landowner has been 
deprived of all economically viable use of his property”212 after “five 
years, five formal decisions, and 19 different site plans” had been 
206. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982). 
207. 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
208. Id. at 391. 
209. Id. at 405. 
210. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 (citations omitted). 
211. 526 U.S. 687 (1999). 
212. Id. at 720. 
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rejected.213 The four dissenters would have relegated this constitutional 
question to a judge, not a jury.214
Regulations that deprived property owners of some of their rights of 
enjoyment but that fell outside of the three special categories from Lucas 
(deprivations of all economically feasible use),215 City of Monterey 
(regulations conditioning approval of development on the dedication of 
property to the public use),216 and Loretto (“permanent physical 
occupation”),217 remained subject to fact-specific inquiry under the 
factors set forth in Penn Central.218 The Supreme Court cases had 
“identified three factors [of] ‘particular significance’”219 for 
consideration in answer to the original quixotic question of whether the 
police power had been stretched “too far.” It is said that the “inquiry 
turns in large part, albeit not exclusively, upon the magnitude of a 
regulation’s economic impact . . . .”220 Of related importance is the extent 
of the regulations’ “interference with reasonable investment backed 
expectations, and the character of the governmental action . . . .”221 In 
evaluating these factors the Rehnquist Court reached inconsistent and 
often inconclusive results. 
E.  Magnitude of the Loss 
Measurement of the amount of the loss an owner suffers as a result 
of regulation is formulaic. It is the difference between the fair market 
value of the property before imposition of the regulation and the fair 
market value after. But measurement of the magnitude of that loss is 
problematic because of the difficulty in determining the appropriate 
baseline. 
Lucas’s “deprivation of all economically feasible use”222 rule failed 
to define the portion of the property against which the loss of value was 
to be measured. Scalia acknowledged the imprecision of his bright-line 
rule with an example: 
213. Id. at 698. 
214. Id. at 733 (Souter, O’Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
215. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015. 
216. City of Monterey, 526 U.S. at 702–03. 
217. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982). 
218. See supra Part IV.C.I. 
219. See, e.g., Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 224–25 (1986) (citing, 
among other Supreme Court cases, Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 124 
(1978)). 
220. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540 (2005). 
221. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979) (citation omitted). 
222. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992). 
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When, for example, a regulation requires a developer to leave 90% of a 
rural tract in its natural state, it is unclear whether we would analyze 
the situation as one in which the owner has been deprived of all 
economically beneficial use of the burdened portion of the tract, or as 
one in which the owner has suffered a mere diminution in value of the 
tract as a whole.223
And differences of opinion regarding the appropriate measure of the 
diminution of value haunted the precedents. Did Pennsylvania Coal 
entail a total taking of all the coal required to be left in place, or was it 
just a partial taking of the company’s overall mineral rights? Was there a 
wipe-out of the railroad’s air rights in Penn Central, or just an 
interference with its rights to further develop the Grand Central Station 
site? Was the Native American testator totally deprived of his right to 
make a will in Hodel, or was he merely limited in one of the ways in 
which he might alienate his land? 
The Penn Central Court had conceptualized the magnitude of loss as 
a deprivation of value fraction that might be expressed as a percentage. 
Using the allegations in the Euclid case as an illustration, the majority 
expressed the diminution in value as seventy-five percent.224 The 
percentage was derived by using as the numerator the amount of lost 
value ($7,500) and using as the denominator the value of the property 
interest if unrestricted ($10,000).225
By the late twentieth century, the Supreme Court’s understanding of 
property had taken on a multi-dimensional cast: 
[T]he dimensions of a property interest may include a physical 
dimension (which describes the size and shape of the property in 
question), a functional dimension (which describes the extent to which 
an owner may use or dispose of the property in question), and a 
temporal dimension (which describes the duration of the property 
interest).226
But there is no clear rule as to the dimensions of the “property interest” 
(i.e., the denominator) against which the loss of value is to be measured 
in the deprivation fraction. And the determination of this factor was 
223. Id.
224. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978). 
225. See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926). 
226. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 318 
(2002) (quoting from the Court of Appeals’ opinion in the same case).
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crucial under the regulatory takings jurisprudence. When there was a 
partial taking, the magnitude of the loss remained the primary factor in 
determining whether regulation went “too far,” and if there was a finding 
of a “total taking” then the regulations were per se compensable.
In his Lucas dissent, Justice Blackmun expressed concern that “the 
Court’s new policies will spread beyond the narrow confines of the 
present case.”227 This spread may be seen in the state and local courts, 
which have filled with cases in which the pivotal question was whether 
there had been a “total taking.”228 Therein the claimants fervently argued 
that there had been a “deprivation of all economically feasible use” of 
their property so as to categorically entitle them to compensation and to 
avoid the vicissitudes of ad hoc balancing. 
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning 
Agency229 was one such case arguing total economic deprivation that 
made it to the Supreme Court. Therein a planning agency had imposed a 
moratorium, which prohibited virtually all use of the land for thirty-two 
months.230 The owners disavowed any argument that the regulations 
constituted a taking under the ad hoc balancing approach in Penn Central
and instead argued there had been a per se compensable total taking for 
the term of the moratorium.231 The Court majority denied relief, but 
Justice Thomas’s dissent argued that it should have awarded 
compensation for the total “temporal deprivation.”232
Justice Scalia had expressed regret in Lucas that “uncertainty 
regarding the composition of the denominator in [the] ‘deprivation’ 
fraction has produced inconsistent pronouncements by the Court.”233
That uncertainty persists. 
F.  Reasonable Investment Backed Expectations 
Basic notions of fairness dictate that when governments actively 
encourage owners to invest in property, they should pay compensation if 
they retroactively change the rules so as to interfere with the owners’
reasonable expectations. Conversely, takings challenges should be 
dismissed if they “[do] not interfere with interests that were sufficiently 
227. Id. at 1036. 
228. A Lexis Terms and Connector Search of “Lucas” and “total taking” in the Federal & 
State Cases, Combined database on April 10, 2008, http://w3.lexis.com/lawschoolreg/research 
login08.asp?t=y&fac=yes, found ninety-four federal and state cases. 
229. 535 U.S. 302 (2002). 
230. Id. at 306. 
231. Id. at 320–21.
232. Id. at 355. 
233. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992) (citations omitted). 
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bound up with the reasonable expectations of the claimant to constitute 
‘property’ for Fifth Amendment purposes.”234 The Rehnquist Court 
found itself profoundly divided when applying these propositions. For 
example, in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel,235 the Court assessed the 
constitutionality of a Coal Act that Congress had passed in 1992, which 
assigned retiree health care benefit obligations for over one thousand 
miners to a coal company that had left the industry twenty-seven years 
before.236 In a five to four split judgment, a pro-property rights majority 
on the Court characterized the legislation as having imposed “severe 
retroactive liability on a limited class of parties that could not have 
anticipated the liability” and then struck down the law as violating the 
Takings Clause.237 The dissent argued that since there had been an 
implicit understanding in coal labor negotiations of the 1960s that the
company owed lifetime health benefits to the miners, the company’s 
claim was unsupported by disappointed expectations.238
In Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,239 the claimant acquired title to a parcel 
of land subject to a pre-existing regulation that placed substantial 
limitations on its development.240 Prior to review by the Supreme Court, 
the Rhode Island Supreme Court denied relief under a takings claim, 
reasoning that the claimant was on notice of the regulation, and 
therefore, lacked the requisite investment-backed expectation.241 In a 
fractured decision consisting of six overlapping opinions, a majority of 
five reversed and held that the post-enactment purchase did not 
necessarily defeat the takings claim.242 The case was remanded to 
consider the claim under the Penn Central rule.243 The Court was in 
agreement that “fairness and justice” required the protection of a 
property owner’s reasonable investment-backed expectations, but it was 
unable to agree if and when such expectations were reasonable. 
234. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978) (citations omitted). 
235. 524 U.S. 498 (1998) (plurality opinion). 
236. Id. at 503–04, 516–17. 
237. Id. at 528–29. 
238. Id. at 550–53. 
239. 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
240. Id. at 626. 
241. Id. at 616. 
242. Id. at 627–28. The Court reasoned that “[a] State would be allowed, in effect, to put an 
expiration date on the Takings Clause. This ought not to be the rule.” Id. at 627. And the Court 
continued, “[a] blanket rule that purchasers with notice have no compensation right when a claim 
becomes ripe is too blunt an instrument to accord with the duty to compensate for what is taken.” Id. 
at 628. 
243. Id. at 632. 
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G.  Character of the Governmental Action 
The “character of the governmental action” is also to be considered 
when the Court engages in its ad hoc fact-specific analysis to determine 
whether the police power has been stretched too far. The Court has not 
spoken much of this factor in the years since Lucas but related 
precedents suggest how the battle line may be drawn when it is 
considered next. A body of precedent supports the proposition that 
regulation designed to prevent a “substantial threat to public health and 
safety” need not be supported by compensation to disadvantaged 
property owners.244 Justice Scalia debunked this principle in the Lucas
case (in the context of “total takings”), but there were four dissenting 
justices who may well undertake to revitalize the exception in the context 
of “partial takings.” Moreover, even Justice Scalia reluctantly accepted 
the position that severe restrictions might be imposed with impunity so 
long as they are in keeping with the “background principles of the State’s 
law of property and nuisance already [in] place upon land ownership.”245
Hence, in future cases, a finding that the regulation was intended to 
prevent a “noxious use” may tip the balance in favor of a finding of 
legitimacy.246
In other contexts the characteristics of governmental actions may 
cast doubt on their constitutionality. We have already seen in Eastern 
Enterprises that the “retroactive” imposition of pension responsibility on 
an employer made the Coal Act a regulatory taking. And in a series of 
cases Justice Scalia has been on the look-out for governmental 
misbehavior. The majority dismissed Pennell v. City of San Jose247 on 
procedural grounds, but Justice Scalia dissented and argued that an 
ordinance that “singl[ed] out” landlords to privately fund a “welfare 
program [for] ‘hardship’ tenants” was a taking. 248 And he dissented from 
the denial of certiorari in two cases out of his concern for “pretextual . . .
rulings.” In Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach,249 Scalia wanted to review 
whether the State Supreme Court was “invoking nonexistent rules” of the 
244. See supra notes 82–87 and accompanying text. 
245. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992). 
246. In a related context, the Court’s conservative bloc has embraced the harm-benefit 
dichotomy so as to delimit what constitutes a “public use” under the power of eminent domain. Slum 
clearance is a “public use” because it achieves a direct public benefit by eliminating an affirmative 
harm, but private economic redevelopment captures only incidental public benefits. See Kelo v. City 
of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 494, 498–501 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia and Thomas, JJ.). 
247. 485 U.S. 1 (1988). 
248. Id. at 15, 22. 
249. 510 U.S. 1207 (1994). 
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state law of real property so as to create inherent limitations on title.250
And in Lambert v. City & County of San Francisco,251 he wanted to 
consider whether the City was “cloaking within the permit process ‘an 
out-and-out plan of extortion.’”252
V.  LEGACY OF THE REHNQUIST COURT
Chief Justice William Rehnquist died in 2005. He had served on the 
Court as an Associate Justice from 1972 to 1986 and as Chief Justice 
from 1986 to 2005. While an Associate Justice, Rehnquist almost 
unfailingly supported the claims of disappointed property owners for 
compensation. As Chief Justice he presided over more than thirty 
regulatory takings cases, most of which were decided by a five-to-four or 
six-to-three majority.253 Over its last thirteen years the Rehnquist Court 
consisted of two blocs: the philosophical right, with Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas defending “constitutional 
property” against governmental infringement; and the philosophical left, 
with Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer acting as “progressive” 
supporters of the power of representative legislatures to act as the 
“laboratories of democracy” without paying for every change in the 
law.254 Justices Stevens, O’Connor, and Kennedy moved between the 
two camps, thereby shifting the balance of decision. Gone was any 
pretence that the Court was engaged in the congenial common-law 
process of agreeing to disagree while “deliberately, incrementally, one-
step-at-a-time”255 growing and developing a law of regulatory takings 
that was both fair and just. The Rehnquist Court was fundamentally split. 
The Rehnquist Court’s “Great Divide” is sometimes attributed to a 
difference in judicial philosophy. Those on the Court’s conservative 
wing are typically described as practitioners of “judicial restraint.”256
Their appointed task was to interpret the Constitution, not to expand 
250. See id. at 1211. 
251. 529 U.S. 1048 (2000). 
252. Id. at 1551 (quoting Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987)).
253. See generally, Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 
U.S. 302 (2002); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 
505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); 
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); Kaiser Aetna v. United 
States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979). 
254. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311–12 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state 
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic 
experiments . . . .”).
255. Scalia, supra note 155, at 1177. 
256. See ORIGINALISM supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
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upon it. They would discern the “rule of law” from the “plain meaning” 
of the text and the “original understanding” of its import.257 Those on the 
Court’s left are said to be devotees of a “living Constitution.”258 From 
their viewpoint, if the Constitution is to endure over time it must be 
flexible and responsive to changing circumstances, and the task of the 
jurist is to reconstruct its language to meet the exigencies of the times.259
The Rehnquist Court’s Takings Clause jurisprudence belies this 
stereotype. Although Rehnquist is generally credited with fostering 
compromise in order to achieve broad majorities, in the context of the 
Takings Clause cases, he was unrelenting in his efforts to protect private 
property rights from the “petty larceny of the police power.”260 Working 
in concert with Justices Scalia and Thomas, he purposefully attributed to 
the text of the Takings Clause a meaning inconsistent with its “plain 
language” and “original understanding.”
“Property” in the vernacular refers to physical assets, and a “takings” 
amounts to physical seizures. Blackstone and his colonial contemporaries 
so understood the terms, and legal historians agree.261 Even Justice 
Scalia, the leading proponent of constitutional property, reluctantly 
acknowledged that “early constitutional theorists did not believe the 
Takings Clause embraced regulations of property at all . . . .”262 Chief 
Justice Rehnquist’s expansion of this definition so as to prohibit any 
regulations that diminished “the group of rights inhering in the citizen’s 
257. See generally Scalia, supra note 155. 
258. See, e.g., William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV.
693, 695 (1976) (“I have sensed a . . . connotation of the phrase ‘living Constitution,’ . . . quite 
different from . . . the Holmes version, but which certainly has gained [some] acceptance . . . .
[N]onelected members of the federal judiciary may address themselves to a social problem simply 
because other branches of government have failed or refused to do so.”).
259. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary 
Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433 (1986). Brennan’s article, which was first delivered as a speech 
on October 12, 1985 at Georgetown University, states:
But the ultimate question must be: What do the words of the text mean in our time? For 
the genius of the Constitution rests not in any static meaning it might have had in a world 
that is dead and gone, but in the adaptability of its great principles to cope with current 
problems and current needs. 
Id. at 438. 
260. HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS, supra note 55, at 457. 
261. See 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 37, at 16 (defining real property as “permanent, fixed, 
and immoveable, . . . as lands and tenements” and personal property as “goods; money, and all other 
moveables; which may attend the owner’s per[s]on wherever he thinks proper to go”); see also supra 
note 40 and accompanying text. 
262. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 n.15 (1992). 
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relation to the physical thing”263 was a calculated exercise in judicial 
activism. 
Justices Stevens, Breyer, Ginsberg, and Souter, on the other hand, 
were quite willing to accept the Takings Clause at face value. Just 
compensation was due only when property was taken; “property” was 
land or chattel, and “taking” was seizure. Regulations had nothing to do 
with it. Perhaps these jurists were philosophically invested in a “living” 
Constitution, but in this context at least they willingly embraced the 
presumption of constitutionality and deferred to the regulatory choices of 
the legislatures. They were the practitioners of “judicial restraint.”
The division on the Rehnquist Court had more to do with political 
philosophy than judicial process. In his 1981 Presidential Address 
President Ronald Reagan had proclaimed that “government is not the 
solution to our problem; government is the problem.”264 Reagan’s 1986 
appointees, Justices Rehnquist and Scalia, adopted this point of view 
with their expansive Takings jurisprudence. Along with Justice Thomas 
(and sometimes Justices O’Connor and Kennedy) they embraced the 
free-market cause of efficient competition by seeking to require that 
regulators “internalize” the full cost of prohibitions. In the words of 
Richard Posner “[t]he simplest economic explanation for the requirement 
of just compensation is that it prevents the government from overusing 
the taking power.”265 To this argument Justice Scalia would add a 
corollary: 
The politically attractive feature of regulation is not that it permits 
wealth transfers to be achieved that could not be achieved otherwise; 
but rather that it permits them to be achieved “off budget,” with relative 
invisibility and thus relative immunity from normal democratic 
processes. . . . 
That fostering of an intelligent democratic process is one of the 
happy effects of the constitutional prescription [in the Takings 
Clause].266
Hence, from a conservative viewpoint, an expansive definition of the 
Takings Clause has the political advantages of both discouraging 
inefficient government activity and of making government more 
263. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 142 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (citation omitted). 
264. President Ronald Reagan, First Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1981), available at
http://www.reaganlibrary.com/reagan/speeches/first.asp (speaking with regard to what he perceived, 
at that time, as an economic crisis). 
265. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 58 (4th ed. 1992). 
266. Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 22, 23 (1988). 
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accountable.267 In the absence of judicial oversight, legislatures and 
executives might “do anything [they] can get away with.”268
The progressive vision, on the other hand, considered Congress, state 
legislatures, and local councils as well-intentioned promoters of the 
public health, safety, and general welfare; these legislative bodies could 
themselves be trusted to abide by the Constitution, and the unelected and 
non-representative judges should accept their public choices. The 
likeminded jurists on the Rehnquist Court (Justices Brennan, Blackmun, 
Marshall in the first generation and Justices Stevens, Breyer, Ginsburg, 
and Souter in the second) deferred to the democratically-elected branches 
of government; at least with respect to property rights, they were more 
than willing to give discretion to legislative bodies to enact regulations 
without paying for every change in the law. Exercises of the police 
power were presumed to be a good thing. In the words of Justice 
Thurgood Marshall, “burdens consequent upon government action 
undertaken in the public interest must be borne by individual landowners 
as concomitants of ‘the advantage of living and doing business in a 
civilized community’. . . .”269
AFTERWORD
John Roberts was appointed Chief Justice of the United States 
Supreme Court in 2005. The Roberts Court remains politically 
conflicted, one vote away from a clear conservative majority. The 
Court’s present interpretation of the Takings Clause sits upon a shaky 
foundation of split decisions; its construction of the constitutional 
property remains a work in progress. Justice Antonin Scalia, the chief 
architect of conservative change, will likely press for a further 
remodeling of regulatory takings jurisprudence. Perhaps he will foster a 
conservative consensus creating clear and definite rules requiring 
compensation to all persons who suffer a loss in property value because 
of government regulation. Or perhaps newcomers to the Court will 
solidify a moderate majority that adheres to the traditional presumption 
of constitutionality for well-intentioned exercises of the police power. 
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